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WAITING FOR JOHN DOE: THE PRACTICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DNA
INDICTMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the past two decades, DNA evidence has
become a powerful tool for both prosecutors and defense attorneys in
criminal trials.' Because it is generally accepted as accurate, this evidence
is used in a myriad of ways in various legal proceedings. 2 Notably, in
recent years, prosecutors in several states frequently utilized the practice of
obtaining a DNA sample from an unknown suspect and issuing a so-called3
"John Doe" indictment based on the profile developed from the sample.
However, the proliferation of this new prosecutorial device has not come

I

See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting it was first

appellate court to address admissibility of DNA evidence), overruled by Hadden v. State, 690 So.
2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997); see also George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of
DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2465 (1997)
(commenting that value of DNA evidence is useful to both sides of criminal proceeding).
Because DNA evidence can operate as a virtual certainty as to whether a defendant was present at
the scene of a crime, both sides can utilize it as an effective tool. See Smith & Gordon, supra, at
2465.
2 See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting all fifty states maintain
DNA collection banks with samples from inmates); Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie,
The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1473 (2007) (stating post-conviction DNA testing has exonerated
wrongfully accused convicts); Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing and Proof of
Paternity: Some Controversy and Key Issues For Family Law Counsel, 57 LA. L. REV. 379, 380
(1997) (stating federal government requires states provide genetic testing in contested paternity
cases); see also Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science:
Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 654 (2007) (asserting reliability of DNA
testing has made it "gold standard" of forensic evidence). But see Kristen Bolden, Note, DNA
Fabrication, A Wake Up Call: The Need to Reevaluate the Admissibility and Reliability of DNA
Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409, 410 (2011) (arguing that DNA evidence is not absolutely
trustworthy).
3 See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878, 882, 884-85 (Mass. 2010) (describing
process for issuing DNA indictment); cases cited, infra note 88 (listing cases where DNA
indictments utilized); see also Micah Sucherman, Note, People v. Robinson: Developments and
Problems in the Use of "John Doe" DNA Arrest Warrants, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 897-901
(2011) (examining approach taken by four states toward "John Doe" indictments). The first high
court to look at a challenge to a "John Doe" DNA indictment was the Kansas Supreme Court.
Sucherman, supra, at 900. Other states, including Wisconsin, Ohio, and New York, have also
upheld the use of DNA indictments. Id. at 897-99.
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without concerns.
The main criticisms typically aimed at John Doe DNA indictments
focus on the perceived deficiencies of DNA evidence, which can be
exacerbated by the gap in time between the collection of a sample and the
location of a match.5 Some have argued that by indicting a DNA sample,
prosecutors are able to toll the statute of limitations of the alleged crime
until attaching a name to the indictment, allowing for an endless period
during which an identity can be later found. 6 Questions thus arise as to
whether the use of John Doe DNA indictments violates the statutory and
constitutional rights of criminal defendants who are eventually linked to the
originating crime. 7
Despite these criticisms, courts have found
overwhelmingly in favor of the constitutionality of these indictments. 8
This Note examines the problems that DNA indictments raise for
criminal defendants as well as the potential safeguards against prosecutorial
abuse in issuing nameless indictments. 9 Part II discusses the factual and
legal background of DNA evidence, including its historical development,
technical underpinnings, and weaknesses.' 0 Part III traces the history and
4 See Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone is Enough to Convict,
85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1130, 1145-46 (2010) ("Some have voiced concern that DNA alone carries too
great a risk of laboratory error, coincidental matches, or other injustice to be permissible.").
5 See id.; Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be
Based on a
Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 45 (2007) (citing

laboratory errors as potential cause of wrongful convictions); Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment,
Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and
Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 979, 983-84 (2001) (arguing inaccuracy of DNA evidence
can lead to "misguided prosecutions"). Bernasconi argues further that the gap in time between an
indictment and an actual trial can violate a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Bernasconi, supra,
at 984.
6 See Frank B. Ulmer, Note, Using DNA Profiles to Obtain "John Doe" Arrest Warrants and
Indictments, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585, 1599-1600 (2001) (issuing arrest warrant or filing
indictment tolls statute of limitations). Problems may arise when criminal proceedings begin
years after an alleged crime occurs. Id. at 1613. Ulmer notes that as time passes, evidence
becomes less reliable, which then calls into question the defendant's rights. Id. at 1613-14.
7 See Bernasconi, supra 5, at 990 (questioning "validity and legitimacy" of DNA indictments
when considering historical use of statutes of limitations). One of the primary purposes of having
a statute of limitations for most crimes is to protect against the risk of an unfair trial brought on
by evidence that is no longer reliable. Id. at 995. Bernasconi argues that "John Doe" indictments
are directly contrary to this purpose. Id. at 999. Another concern is the potential conflict these
indictments have with the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause. See id. at 1024.
8 See Sucherman, supra 3, at 901 ("[C]ourts appear very willing to accept 'John Doe' DNA
arrest warrants as sufficiently particular to satisfy the demands of the statute of limitations and the
Fourth Amendment ... courts do not seem particularly concerned with 'speedy trial' issues that
may arise from the use of 'John Doe' DNA arrest warrants."); cases cited infra note 88 and
accompanying text (examining cases that affirmed use of such warrants).
9 See infra Part V (detailing specific problems and criticisms of indictments and suggesting
possible solutions).
10 See infra Part II (recounting specifics surrounding use of DNA evidence).
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purpose behind statutes of limitations, the Fourth Amendment's
particularity requirement, and the Sixth Amendment's "Speedy Trial"
clause." Part IV details the history of John Doe indictments prior to the
use of DNA technology through the present. 12 Part V concludes by
examining the current problems with issuing John Doe indictments,
suggesting measures to ensure that defendants are not burdened by the use
of these indictments, and anticipating future developments of the law.' 3
II.

DNA EVIDENCE

A. Admissibility
Like all forms of scientific evidence, DNA evidence is subject to
14
certain admissibility standards in all federal and state jurisdictions.

11 See infra Part III (examining rationale behind principles that arguably conflict with "John
Doe" indictments).
12 See infra Part IV (looking at case law and statutes relevant to indictments).
13 See infra Part V (reviewing state of law and suggesting alternatives).
14 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 -98 (1993) (noting
Frye test
superseded by adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (introducing first test for admissibility of scientific-based evidence). In Frye, the
D.C. Court of Appeals established that the test for admissibility of scientific evidence was based
on whether the principle upon which the evidence was developed was generally accepted by the
scientific community. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (stating test's standards). This test was used by
courts throughout the country until it was supplanted by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the Daubert decision. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 ("Nothing in the text of this Rule
establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor [is there] any
clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a 'general
acceptance' standard."). Rule 702 states:

A witness who is qualified as an expert ... may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if. (a) the expert's... knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c)the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED R. EVID. 702. Typically, the introduction of DNA evidence requires accompanying expert
testimony to familiarize the jury with the scientific procedures it entails. See Ryan Patrick
O'Malley, Comment, Criminal Law Inconclusive DNA Test Results Admitted as Relevant
Evidence Despite Absence of Random Match Probability Analysis Commonwealth v. Mattei,
892 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008), 14 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 127, 138 n.48
(2009). While the majority of states now follow the Daubert test, a minority still accepts test
established in Frye. See Kavita Pillai, Comment, Another "Competitive Enterprise": A Balanced
Private-Public Solution to North Carolina's Forensic Science Problem, 90 N.C. L. REv. 253, 284
n.186 (2011) (noting that "Frye remains the test in more than a dozen states"). Thus, DNA
evidence is subject to scrutiny under whichever approach the relevant jurisdiction follows. See,
e.g., Allen v. State, 62 So. 3d 1199, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (subjecting DNA evidence to
Frye test); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (adopting modified
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Today, courts in all fifty states accept that DNA evidence meets the
thresholds for admissibility established in both the Daubert and Frye
decisions.15 Not only is such evidence generally accepted by the scientific
community in accordance with Frye, but it is also conforms to the Daubert
decision's emphasis on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 16
B. Collection and Testing
DNA evidence can be obtained from samples including human
skin, hair, blood, semen, and other bodily fluids and tissues. 17 Aside from
being obtainable from any cell in the human body, DNA evidence is such a
useful device because it is unique to each individual.' 8 Once a sample has
been acquired, several different methods of analysis may be used to
develop a profile of the suspect. 19 Initially, the most common form of
DNA testing was Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP")
analysis. 20 As compared with other forms of DNA testing, RFLP analysis
requires a larger sized genetic sample from which a human profile can be
developed and then compared with that of a known defendant or with those

version of Daubert and using it to analyze DNA evidence); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (accepting Daubert approach and applying it to admissibility of DNA
evidence).
15

See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1656 (2008)

("[D]NA evidence is now admissible at trial in all states.").
16 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89 (creating test that conforms with Federal Rules of
Evidence); Frye, 293 F. at 1013 (establishing first test for admissibility of scientific evidence);
see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (detailing Frye and Daubert standards).
17 See Ulmer, supra 6, at 1591 (enumerating various sources of human DNA).
Ulmer
explains that after having obtained a DNA sample from one of these sources, a genetic profile of
an individual can be developed. Id.
18 See
DNA
Matching,
FORENSIC
SC.,
http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/00206/textpti dnamatching.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012)
(analyzing power of DNA evidence).
19 See United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining Polymerase
Chain Reaction ("PCR") method of DNA testing), overruled by United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d
499, 503 (9th Cir. 2008); Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(detailing Short Tandem Repeat variety of PCR testing); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
440, 446-48 (Mass. 1991) (describing Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP")
DNA analysis); see also Smith & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2471 (examining steps in PCR
testing); Riley, infra note 20 and accompanying text (examining steps in each type of DNA
testing).
20 See State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 271 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("The RFLP testing process is

the most common method used for DNA matching."); Donald E. Riley, DNA Testing: An
Introduction for Non-Scientists An Illustrated Explanation, SC. TESTIMONY AN ONLINE
JOURNAL (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/riley/riley.html (commenting
that RFLP analysis has all but been replaced by PCR analysis).
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collected in a databank.2 ' This process consists of seven steps that
culminate in the creation of a set of genetic bands that can be used for
comparison purposes with a known suspect or a grouping of samples to
ascertain a statistical match. 22 This type of analysis is believed to be less
susceptible to contamination when compared to alternative methods.2 3
However, despite this advantage, RFLP testing is rarely used and has been
largely replaced by a faster and more sensitive process called Polymerase
Chain Reaction ("PCR") analysis.24
PCR analysis was first developed in the early 1990s and eventually
25
became the preferred method of DNA examination. Unlike RFLP testing,
the PCR method is not used to create a statistical match between two DNA
samples, but rather to exclude individuals as potential matches via a threestep process. 6 The major advantage that PCR testing has over RFLP
testing is that PCR can be done with a very small genetic sample, which in
21

See Riley, supra 20. For RFLP testing to be a viable option, the sample must not only be

larger than that which would be usable with other methods but it must also be adequately
preserved, rendering older samples useless with this procedure. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court thoroughly described the testing as a seven-step process. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at
446. First, the biological sample must be chemically extracted from the surface or material it was
left on so the DNA can be separated. Id. Second, the DNA sample is cut at specific points and
creates what are called restriction fragments. Id. Third, the remaining restriction fragments are
then separated according to length within a gel. Id. at 446-47. Fourth, the fragments are
transferred to a nylon membrane where they are then each split in half. Id. at 447. Fifth,
restriction fragments that contain certain types of alleles are separated from the rest using a probe
with a corresponding allele attached to it via a process called hybridization. Id. Sixth, a pattern
of bands is created by the energy on the probes attached to the restriction fragments. Id. The
position of these bands tends to be different from person to person. Id. Finally, the print of the
bands is compared with that of the suspect or with a databank to determine the accuracy of the
possible match. Id. The frequency at which the band appears within the general population is
extremely relevant in this comparison stage. Id. at 447-48. The less likely the band appears it
appears in the general population, the greater the likelihood of a match and vice -versa. Id. at 448.
22 See Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 446-48 (describing seven-step RFLP testing process); Riley,
supra 21 and accompanying text (describing RFLP testing and sample size).
23 See Pruitt v. Brown, No. 08-CV-01495, 2011 WL 3555829, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2011)
(recounting testimony that PCR testing may be more easily contaminated than RFLP testing).
24 See Riley, supra 20 (stating reasons why PCR has largely overtaken RFLP).
The
combination of speed at which PCR testing can be completed and the results it produces makes it
the preferred analysis method. Id.
25 See D. Scott Porch, IV, Comment, Evidence
State v. Begley: When the Tennessee
Supreme Court Meets PCR-Method DNA Analysis, It's Love at First Sight, 28 U. MEM. L. REV.
1239, 1242-43 (1998) (noting time of test's development and subsequent popularity). Part of the
appeal of PCR testing is that it is seen as a quicker and cheaper alternative to RFLP testing. Id. at
1243.
26 See United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1996) (commenting on nature of
three-step procedure), overruled by United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 2008).
Much like RFLP testing, the first step in PCR testing is to extract the DNA sample from wherever
it was left. Id. Secondly, in a process referred to as amplification, scores of copies of the DNA
fragment are created. Id. Lastly, the remaining product is compared with other samples. Id.
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turn can come from older and potentially degraded sources that would not
be suitable for RFLP analysis.2 7 As noted, however, the major drawback of
PCR testing is that it is prone to contamination and can in turn produce
incorrect results.28
The most commonly used method of DNA analysis today is a
variation of PCR testing referred to as Polymerase Chain Reaction Short
Tandem Repeat ("PCR-STR") testing. 29 Much like ordinary PCR testing,
the PCR-STR method amplifies a certain portion of a DNA sample and
uses that amplification for comparison purposes.3 0 The major difference is
that PCR-STR analysis focuses primarily on certain DNA strands called
short tandem repeats ("STR").3' The results produced by PCR-STR tests
are generally considered to be the most accurate, which in turn has made it
the primary method currently used by technicians throughout the United
States.3 2 However, in spite of its popularity, PCR-STR testing has not been
immune from criticism.33 The primary concern, similar to other forms of

27
28

See Porch, supra 25, at 1243 (noting that only small sample is required for PCR testing).
See Smith & Gordon, supra 1, at 2471 (finding contamination in PCR testing process can

lead to amplification of wrong DNA). Additionally, Smith and Gordon note other drawbacks of
PCR testing specifically related to the type of alleles examined in a PCR test. Id. at 2471 -72.
Such a problem can lead to further difficulties distinguishing the sample from the general
population. Id.
29 See Emilee Davenport, Note, The Admissibility of DNA Evidence in Vermont Courts
After Pfenning, 29 VT. L. REv. 1009, 1017 (2005) (recognizing PCR-STR analysis is
"predominate" method used by American labs). Because PCR-STR tests can produce extremely
likely match results, it is typically viewed as the most accurate method of DNA analysis. Id.
30 See Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 446-48 (Mass. 1991) (describing RFLP
analysis); Davenport, supra note 29, at 1016-17 (describing similarities between two models of
analysis); Riley, supra 21 and accompanying text (detailing RFLP analysis process); see also
State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. 2003) (elaborating on PCR-STR test process). The
testing process can be broken down into five parts. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 889. Like the other
methods previously discussed, the DNA must first be extracted and separated from its source.
See Hicks, 103 F.3d at 844-45; Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 446-48; Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 889
(noting first step of testing process); Davenport, supra 21 and accompanying text (detailing RFLP
and PCR testing procedures).
Second, technicians determine how much isolated DNA is
available. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 889. Third, the strands of DNA are copied during the
amplification period. Id. Fourth, the copied strands are separated based on size. Id. Finally, the
sizes of the STR fragments are determined and can be used for comparison purposes. Id.
31 See Davenport, supra 29, at 1016 (finding STRs are targeted because of their varying
length amongst human population). Because short tandem repeats are a different length in each
individual, analyzing large sample sizes "allows for identification." Traylor, 656 N.W.2d at 889.
32 See Davenport, supra 29, at 1017 (commenting on reliability of and praise for PCR-STR
method).
33 See Riley, supra 20 (describing how PCR testing generally is subject to
crosscontamination). Riley asserts that "[g]ood PCR technique is no guarantee that contamination
didn't influence the results." Id. Because STRs lack immune systems, they may be particularly
susceptible to contamination. Id. Furthermore, if steps are not taken to detect contamination, it
could very easily go unnoticed. Id.
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testing, focuses on the great
potential for contamination that can occur
34
process.
testing
the
during
C. DNA Evidence Criticism
The use of DNA evidence in court proceedings has been closely
scrutinized for a variety of reasons. 35 A frequent critique has been the
potential for crime lab errors that lead to erroneous results.36 During the
past decade, there have been a number of incidents throughout the United
States in which DNA testing was compromised and inaccurate results were
produced. 37 If the crime lab assigned to analyze a DNA sample commits an
error, whether it is intentional or not, the potential arises for serious
complications in the legal proceedings. 38 False positive results have the
potential to lead to wrongful convictions. 39 The significant number of
34

See id. (elaborating on contamination threat during testing).

35 See generally Kimberley Cogdell Boies, Misuse of DNA Evidence Is Not Always a

"Harmless Error": DNA Evidence, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Wrongful Conviction, 17 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 403, 411-20 (2011) (listing various problems associated with DNA
evidence). Boies suggests a litany of concerns that exist and complications that can arise with the
introduction of DNA evidence. Id. These issues range from those that are purely scientific in
nature to those that are associated with courts and jurors. Id. Specifically, she points to
inadequate amounts of DNA, false positive results, intentional crime lab fabrications, and juror
confusion as issues of primary concern. Id.
36 See William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the 'Gold Standard:' Understanding Recent
Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 10-11 (discussing problem of
botched lab work being used in criminal proceedings).

37 See id. at 10-12 (enumerating various examples of mistaken crime lab work). Several high
profile incidents of mishandled DNA testing emerged during the early 2000s. Id. at 10. For
example, in Houston, Texas in 2003, the Houston Police Department shut down a local crime lab
that had produced dozens of test results that other labs were unable to confirm. Id. Most
disturbingly, two men were wrongfully incriminated of crimes based on these faulty results. Id.
Thompson notes several other incidents that occurred throughout the country in places such as
Virginia, Seattle, and North Carolina in which labs failed to conduct accurate tests. Id. Further,
Thompson argues that these incidents are not indicative of any new problems with DNA testing
that have only arisen over the past decade, but rather that they always existed and are only now
being recognized. Id. at 11.
38 See id. (finding numerous incidents of wrongful convictions and incriminations based on
false DNA analysis).
39 See id. at 10 (noting several incidents of use of fallacious DNA evidence in criminal
proceedings). The 1984 Virginia case of Earl Washington, Jr., a mentally handicapped man who
was falsely convicted of murder and sentenced to death, is particularly noteworthy. Id.; see also
Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 589 (Va. 1984) (detailing grounds for
Washington's appeal). Washington's initial conviction was upheld due to incorrect DNA
analysis. Washington, 323 S.E.2d at 589 (affirming conviction and refusing to commute death
sentence); Thompson, supra note 36, at 10-12. After learning of the false DNA results, Governor
James Gilmore issued an absolute pardon for Washington's murder conviction, and Washington
was released from prison on February 21, 2001. See Earl Washington, THE INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/EarlWashington.php (last visited Dec. 1,
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incidents in which wrongful convictions have been secured based on faulty
lab work calls into question whether DNA evidence should be so readily

relied upon.40
Some errors in DNA testing may result more from the sample itself
than from human error. 41 As discussed, PCR testing, which is the preferred
method, does not require a large sample size of DNA.42 While many view

this point as a major advantage of using this test, one of the drawbacks that
it carries is the fact that water and other substances used during the
amplification process are vulnerable to contamination.4 3 Without proper
oversight of the testing procedure, the risk exists that a contaminated DNA
sample is being analyzed.44
A third problem with DNA evidence arises from the lay-people
who comprise juries. 4 Research shows that jurors often fail to properly
interpret probability statistics that commonly accompany introduction of

DNA evidence and are easily swayed by how these numbers are offered.46
Consequently, jurors can very easily misinterpret any statistical data

2012) (detailing Washington's case and exoneration).
40 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 10-12 (questioning supposed infallibility of DNA
evidence). Throughout his article, Thompson refers to DNA evidence as "the gold standard"
because of how many interpret it. Id. at 11. However, he poses the question as to why it should
be viewed this way if in fact there is such overwhelming evidence that it has numerous
deficiencies. Id.; see also Bolden, supra note 2, at 424-25 (calling for reevaluation of DNA's
reliability).
41 See Boies, supra 35, at 412 (referencing contamination problems with small
DNA
samples). Boies specifically addresses issues that may arise with PCR testing due to the small
size of the required sample. Id.
42 See Porch, supra note 25, at 1243 (describing need for only small DNA sample with PCR
method).
43 See Boies, supra note 35, at 411-12 (detailing potential sources of contamination). This
point is not to say that such contamination is completely unavoidable. Id. at 412. If the proper
steps are taken, such contamination concerns can be avoided. Id. However, as Boies points out,
labs follow different oversight standards and do not all follow the same procedures, hence the
danger exists for inconsistency. Id.
44 See id. at 411-12 (discussing need for caution when conducting PCR analysis due
to
contamination risk).
45 See id. at 416-20 (describing problems that can arise when presenting DNA evidence to
jurors). Boies notes the so-called "CSI effect" and juror confusion as two primary concerns. Id.
46 See Laurie Meyers, The Problem with DNA, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., June 2007, at 52,
available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/jun07/problem.aspx (discussing indications that people
in general are apt to misinterpret statistics). According to Meyers, studies have shown that
statistical evidence concerning DNA is often misinterpreted. Id. She gives an example where
jurors were more impressed when told that the probability of a match was 0.1 in 100 as opposed
to one in 1000, despite the fact that they are equal. Id. She further elaborates that jurors often
assume that an individual must be the only potential match when they hear probabilities such as
one in ten billion, because they assume it covers everyone without realizing that it is just a
statistical probability and not a definite result. Id.
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concerning the likelihood of a DNA match. 47

Researchers have also

identified a similar problem with jurors, dubbed the "CSI Effect.

48

Coined

after the popular television crime drama, Crime Scene Investigation, the so called effect describes the emphasis jurors tend to place on DNA in what
they perceive as concrete, infallible evidence.49 This effect is in large part
due to the program's unrealistic and uninformative portrayal of DNA
analysis.50 Additionally, jurors may at times expect to be presented with
DNA evidence and give less credibility to a case in which it is not

utilized.5' As a safeguard against these concerns, some courts have taken it
upon themselves to educate
jurors on how to properly interpret the presence
52
evidence.
DNA
of
or lack
III. CONFLICTING CONCEPTS
A. Statutes ofLimitations
The federal government and almost all fifty states have statutes of
limitations pertaining to criminal offenses.53 Primarily an invention of
American law, criminal statutes of limitations have long played an

47 See Meyers, supra note 46, at 52 and accompanying text (noting problems
juries may have
interpreting statistical information).
48 See Boies, supra note 35, at 416-17 (describing basis for "CSI Effect"). The television

drama Crime Scene investigation often portrays the use of DNA analysis. Id. As a result, many
jurors have come to expect DNA evidence to be introduced at trial, and some studies suggest that
jurors place an undue level of reliance on such analysis. Id. at 417.
49 See id. at 416 (noting influence of effect). Boies notes that one particular study showed
jurors "found DNA evidence to be 95% accurate and 94% persuasive." Id. On the contrary, she
notes that other studies have shown that jurors do not place any overemphasis on DNA. Id.
However, this danger still exists and courts must remain vigilant to prevent juror bias. Id.
50 See id. at 417 (commenting that Crime Scene Investigation does not give jurors better
understanding of DNA).
51 See id. at 416-17 (noting problem of jurors assuming DNA evidence is routinely
introduced).
52 See Kelly v. State, 6 A.3d 396, 411 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (instructing jurors
how
scientific information should be interpreted). In Kelly, the presiding judge instructed the jurors
during voir dire to identify themselves if they were unable to assess the defendant without
scientific data. Id.; see also United States v. Gentles, 619 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding
mention of "CSI Effect" not prejudicial enough to warrant mistrial); Commonwealth v. Seng, 924
N.E.2d 285, 295-96 (Mass. 2010) (finding judge appropriate in cautioning jury against drawing
negative inference from lack of forensic testing).
53 Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at
Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 199, 249-50 (1995) (noting prevalence of statutes of limitations
in American legal system). However, Adlestein does mention that because statutes of limitations
are legislative creations, each state approaches them differently causing them to vary in length on
a state-by-state basis. Id. at 250 n.223 (providing examples of differences among states).
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important role in the justice system. 54 Specifically, statutes of limitations
aim to ensure that individuals do not have to defend themselves against
facts and accusations that may have occurred so long ago that they are now
difficult to contest.55 Though capital offenses, namely murder, typically do
not have a statute of limitations, most other crimes employ a set time limit
to ensure that the individual defendant is protected against overly
prolonged prosecution. 56 Additionally, courts have often emphasized the
need for law enforcement to conduct swift and effective investigations
of
57
crimes as an important rationale behind criminal statutes of limitations.
Numerous other reasons have been proposed as to why statutes of
limitations are important and necessary components of criminal justice

proceedings.58

Whether these reasons are to protect the rights of the

accused, to appease the public, or to serve as a means of more effectively
pursuing and prosecuting offenders, there is little doubt that criminal

54 See id. at 249-55 (discussing origins of statutes of limitations). Unlike much of American
law, statutes of limitations did not originate in English law. Id. at 254-55. Instead, their origins
in the United States can be traced to the First Congress. Id. at 252.
55 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) ("The purpose of a statute of
limitation is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time .... Such
a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges
when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the
danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past."); see also United States v.
Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1932) (stating that criminal statutes of limitations should be
"liberally interpreted in favor of repose"). In Scharton, the Court insisted that statutory crimes
should not be extended to include offenses not within their bounds. Id. at 522.
56 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 8 (2011) (excusing murder and various sex crimes
from statute of limitations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 (2012) (noting murder and many
violent crimes do not carry statute of limitations); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (West 2010)
(excluding numerous felonies from statute of limitations). Courts have cited the intolerability of
allowing a murderer to escape justice due to the mere passage of time as the main purpose for not
having a statute of limitations for such offenses. United States v. Gallaher, 624 F.3d 934, 942
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
For most crimes, however, the goal remains to protect individuals from defending against
accusations from long in the past. See cases cited supra note 55 (quoting Supreme Court's
rationale for criminal statutes of limitations).
57 See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114-15 (suggesting statutes of limitations encourage law
enforcement to speedily conduct investigations); Adlestein, supra note 53, at 262 (mentioning
effect of evidence preclusion encourages swift investigations by law enforcement).
58 See Adlestein, supra note 53, at 264-65 (outlining justifications for time bar on certain
offenses). During the adoption period of the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute
considered five main reasons that justify statutes of limitations. Id. First, and most importantly,
there exists a need to prosecute a case based on fresh evidence. Id. at 265. Second, there is a
belief that as time passes, the need to punish lessens. Id. Third, society is likely to be inclined to
feel more sympathy for a defendant brought up on charges that occurred long in the past. Id.
Fourth, the less time there is to wait for prosecution, the less chance there is of blackmail on
behalf of one who knows of the offense. Id. Lastly, such statutes encourage faster action of
justice and thus create a more secure and harmonious society. Id.
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statutes of limitations have long received a great deal of support from
American lawmakers and court officers. 5 9 Nonetheless,
criminal statutes of
0

limitations are not a constitutionally protected right. 6

Despite the longstanding support for criminal statutes of
limitations, there are those who view them as outdated and unnecessary as

a result of several legal developments. 61 These views reflect the current
attitudes on criminal punishment that are focused primarily on retribution
as opposed to rehabilitation, which some argue is embodied by legal
mechanisms such as John Doe DNA indictments.62 This shift in opinion
has been accompanied by a willingness to extend or abolish criminal
statutes of limitations,
effectively eroding a deep-rooted component of the
63
justice system.

59
60

See id. (listing arguments in favor of criminal statutes of limitations).
Adlestein, supra note 53, at 250 ("No jurisdiction has held that criminal statutes of

limitations are mandatory; they are solely a matter of legislative choice.").
61 See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
115, 135-36 (2008) (presenting argument that technological advances render many evidentiary
concerns moot). Citing an article by Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, Powell points out
that many criticize criminal statutes of limitations because prosecutors now have the resources
available to eliminate many of the past concerns of the reliability of stale evidence. Id. at 136.
Powell, on the other hand, believes that many have shifted their support away from criminal
statutes of limitations because of changing opinions on how best to deal with crime. Id.
Attitudes have recently moved towards a "get-tough-on-crime" approach, whereas thirty to forty
years ago there was an emphasis on the rehabilitative aspects of the criminal justice system. Id.;
see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (recognizing drug addiction as illness
for which incarceration is cruel and unusual punishment); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949) (asserting "reformation and rehabilitation" as primary goals of criminal law as
opposed to retribution). While the view expressed in Williams was the predominant one
throughout the mid-twentieth century, it was entirely supplanted by those seeking retributive
goals through the criminal justice system. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of
Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2003) (noting paradigmatic shift in rationale for criminal punishment).
62 See Alschuler, supra note 61, at 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing modern attitudes
toward crime); Powell, supra note 61, at 136 (acknowledging argument that innovations such as
John Doe indictments reflect new technologies and criminal philosophies). Powell disputes the
argument that exceptions to statutes of limitations can be explained solely by the technological
advances that have resulted in DNA indictments. See Powell, supra note 61, at 136.
63 See James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1223-26 (2004) (commenting that several states have sought to reform
criminal statutes of limitations). DiFonzo argues that technological advances will allow states to
continue creating exceptions to statutes of limitations. Id. at 1220-2 1. For example, Utah greatly
expanded the statute of limitations period for a number of crimes, and former New York
Governor George Pataki advocated for a bill that would have completely eliminated the statute of
limitations on various violent crimes, including first-degree rape, manslaughter, and assault. Id.
at 1225-26.
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B. The FourthAmendment ParticularityRequirement
Another important legal aspect when considering "John Doe" DNA
indictments is the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.64 The
complete history of the Fourth Amendment is a long and complicated one
that has continued to evolve since its inception in the late 1700 s.65 For the
purposes of discussing John Doe indictments, it is best to focus on what has
been dubbed the "particularity requirement. ,66 This clause reads, "[N]o
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

person or things to be seized.

67

The issue of what will constitute a

particular description, especially with regard to warrants, has been debated

and contested for over a century.68
The purpose behind the particularity requirement is to ensure that
searches and seizures supported by a warrant based on probable cause will
be restricted to the authorization of those places and people that are

64 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis added)).
65 See generally Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 933-1036 (2010) (tracing development of Fourth Amendment and its
different interpretations). Throughout his extensive piece, Davies examines how the Fourth
Amendment experienced a constant course of change since its inception, evolving into a doctrine
concerned primarily with criminal arrests. Id. at 941, 1037.
66 See People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 60, 80 (Cal. 2010) (analyzing whether unknown
suspect's DNA profile fulfills particularity requirement). As one of the most recent decisions in
the area of DNA indictments, one of the main focuses in Robinson was determining whether or
not the particularity requirement was met solely by including a DNA profile. Id. at 60-61.
Accordingly, the issue is central to understanding the arguments for and against such indictments.
See id. at 73-75.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added)..
68 See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894) (holding warrant must name or sufficiently
describe individual in question); see also Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 1024-26 (noting potential
constitutional infringement from use of DNA indictments); Hunter, infra note 78, at 624 and
accompanying text (discussing how failure to affix name does not fail to meet particularity
requirement); Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1601-02 (finding DNA profiles satisfy particularity test).
In West v. Cabell, the Supreme Court famously held that an arrest warrant intended for one man,
but incorrectly naming him and failing to sufficiently describe him, failed to meet the
requirements set forth by the Fourth Amendment. 153 U.S. at 85. The plaintiff in Cabell was
arrested under a warrant bearing the name James West. Id. The plaintiff's name was actually
Vandy M. West, and he had never gone by the first name "James." Id. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff was the intended target of the warrant, but the Court ultimately held that
notwithstanding the issuing authority's intent to place the plaintiff on the warrant, it was invalid
for failure to properly name or sufficiently describe him. Id.
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permissible to search. 69 As a whole, the Fourth Amendment was designed
to protect against general searches and unrestrained seizures. 70 By ensuring
that a suspect
is adequately described, the Amendment's goals are
71
satisfied.

C. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
It is also necessary to examine the Sixth Amendment and its socalled "Speedy Trial" Clause when discussing prolonged, un-named
indictments.72 The first portion of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to a "speedy" trial.73 In Barker v. Wingo,74 the
Supreme Court held that to determine whether the rights of a criminal
defendant have been violated, the conduct of both the prosecution and
defense should be weighed against each other. 75 The Court also identified
four key factors to be considered when balancing the behavior of both

parties: "[1]ength of the delay, the reason for the delay,
the defendant's
76
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."

69

See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (detailing purpose of "Warrant Clause"

in Fourth Amendment). This portion of the Fourth Amendment acts as a check on "wide-ranging
exploratory searches" that the Framers of the Constitution specifically sought to avoid. Id. Only
those individuals who are specifically sought after by a warrant should be subject to its intrusions.
Id. at 84-85.
70 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating original
purpose of Fourth Amendment). Justice Stewart noted that early American colonialists were
routinely subject to personal invasions by agents of the British crown as a key reason for the
inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Id.
71 See Garrison,480 U.S. at 84 (discussing purpose of particularity requirement).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ....
(emphasis added)). Some critics of John Doe indictments argue that
by allowing a warrant to exist indefinitely until a name is affixed to it, the Speedy Trial Clause is
violated. See Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 1024-26. The presumably lengthy delay between a
John Doe indictment and an arrest would, some contend, conflict with the Sixth Amendment's
protections for defendants who face extraordinary delays before they are tried. Id. at 1024 -25.
73 U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
74 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
75 Id. at 530 (adopting new test for evaluating potential Sixth Amendment violations). Prior
to Barker, courts determined that a defendant who failed to demand a speedy trial subsequently
waived that right. Id. at 527-28. The Court noted, however, that a defendant still has some
obligation to assert her right to a speedy trial. Id. at 528.
76 Id. at 530 (outlining factors of new Sixth Amendment balancing test). The Court cited the
length of the delay as the factor that would set off an initial inquiry. Id. The issue of a delay is
highly fact-dependent; if the prosecution delays the trial to hinder the defense, it will weigh
heavily against them, whereas the absence of a key witness would not. Id. at 530-31. As to the
defendant's responsibility to assert his right, the Court stated that a defendant's failure to raise a
delay defense would make it difficult to later prove that he was denied any constitutional rights.
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The Sixth Amendment is designed to ensure that criminal
defendants avoid prolonged pre-trial detention, extended public humiliation
resulting from being accused of a crime, and being forced to defend
themselves either with or against deteriorated evidence.77 Arguably, each
of these goals is impacted by the use of DNA indictments. 78 However, no
court has invalidated the use of these indictments on Sixth Amendment
grounds alone.79
IV. JOHN DOE INDICTMENTS
John Doe warrant indictments existed long before the advent of
DNA testing technology.80 Initially, questions existed as to whether a
description of a suspect without an accompanying name would suffice.81
Courts have since made it clear that so long as the best possible description

Id. at 531-32. Lastly, prejudice to the defendant is measured relative to three main interests: "(i)
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Id. at 532.
77 See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (stating these three reasons
as
grounds for right to speedy trial); Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 1018 (listing primary purposes
behind Sixth Amendment). Bernasconi notes that while there are other rationales behind the
Sixth Amendment, these are the three that are most commonly addressed. Bernasconi, supra note
5, at 1018. One other less cited rationale is society's interest in seeing that a defendant is quickly
brought to trial to prevent him from committing an additional crime in the interim period. Id. at
1018 n.252.
78 See Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 1024-26 (discussing potential constitutional
infringements from DNA indictments), If a DNA profile sufficiently describes an individual the
right to a speedy trial should attach when the indictment is filed, despite the fact that the
defendant's liberty is not restrained and the public is unaware of the charge. Id. at 1025-26; see
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eye-witness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification.").. But see Seth T. Hunter, Note, Do DNA Descriptions Provide Sufficient
Information to Prevent the Statute of Limitations From Running?, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 599,
624 (2010) (arguing no violation of constitutional rights). Hunter posits that there is no Sixth
Amendment violation due to the use of a John Doe DNA indictment no matter how long the
delay. Hunter, supra, at 624. Because memories relating to violent and sexual assault crimes are
unlikely to fade in the minds of witnesses and victims, and the police purportedly have a
legitimate purpose in delaying the trial while searching for the true suspect, Hunter argues that
there is no constitutional infringement. Id. at 624-26.
79 See generally Sucherman, supra note 3, at 897-912 (recounting outcome of challenges
to
DNA indictments in several states). Courts in Wisconsin, Ohio, New York, Kansas, and
California have all examined and affirmed Sixth Amendment challenges to John Doe DNA
indictments. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Mass. 2010) (holding
in favor of DNA indictments).
80 See Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. 403, 404-05 (1865) (holding warrant may be
issued without affixing subject's true name). The Crotty court held that a warrant was valid if the
"best" possible description of a suspect was provided, despite the name being inaccurate. Id.
81 See id. (discussing need for sufficient suspect description).
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of a suspect is provided-whether describing his residence, place of

business,
or some other sufficient means of identification-the warrant is
82
valid.

The requirement that an indictment or warrant must sufficiently
describe an individual remains in effect today.83 However, simply indicting
a "John Doe" without any description of the accused and later seeking to
amend the warrant with the suspect's name does not pass constitutional

muster. 84 In recent years, courts have begun to accept the idea that a
genetic profile of an individual suspect is a satisfactory description. 85
In State v. Dabney,8 6 Wisconsin's appellate court affirmed the use
of DNA indictments and became the first state in the country to rule on the
issue.8 7 This decision was followed by those in several other states,
including California, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. 8 To
82

See cases cited infra notes 83-84 (detailing sufficient means of description other than

suspect's name); see also Crotty, 92 Mass. at 405 (same).
83 See Dixon, 938 N.E.2d at 884 (Mass. 2010) (following prior decisions allowing for
descriptive content short of true name). In Dixon, Massachusetts became the most recent state to
uphold the constitutionality of DNA indictments. Id. at 880 -81.
84 Connor v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Mass. 1973) ("It is an inescapable
conclusion that the indictment must contain words of description which have particular reference
to the person whom the Commonwealth seeks to convict. No matter how extensively or
specifically the defendant was described in grand jury proceedings, the constitutional requirement
can be met only by a sufficient description in the indictment itself"). The key element of the
warrant is that it must not be general. See Commonwealth v. Laventure, 894 A.2d 109, 118-119
(Pa. 2006) (invalidating warrant for vagueness). The only two things that must be particularly
described in a warrant are the place to be searched and the individual or things to be seized.
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006).
85 See Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1602 (noting many jurisdictions employing DNA indictments
have held them to be sufficiently descriptive). Ulmer notes that warrants and indictments are
treated in virtually the same manner when dealing with DNA descriptions. Id. at 1601 -02.
86 663 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
87 Id. at 369-74 (describing circumstances of case).
The court in Dabney found that the
particular physical characteristics of the suspect would be useful to enhance "the completeness of
the complaint and warrant." Id. at 372. However, the court found the DNA profile descriptive
enough to satisfy the particularity requirement, and the exclusion of physical characteristics did
not invalidate the warrant. Id.; see also Sucherman, supra note 3, at 897 (noting Dabney
considered first appeal of John Doe DNA arrest warrant).
88 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 80 (Cal. 2010) (finding statute of limitations
was met with use of DNA indictment); State v. Belt, 179 P.3d 443, 450-51 (Kan. 2008) (agreeing
with concept of DNA indictments but reversing conviction due to insufficiency of warrant);
Dixon, 938 N.E.2d at 880-81 (Mass. 2010) (affirming DNA warrant based conviction); People v.
Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d 522, 527-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (affirming conviction based on arrest
made with John Doe DNA warrant); State v. Danley, 13 8 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 7 (Ct. Com. P1. 2006)
(denying motion to dismiss DNA indictment based on Sixth Amendment argument). The second
court to examine this issue was Ohio's Court of Common Pleas in State v. Danley. 138 Ohio
Misc. 2d at 5 (examining only prior decision on issue). The court's decision closely analyzed
whether a John Doe DNA indictment violated the Sixth Amendment and concluded that it did
not. Id. at 7-8. In People v. Martinez, the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division held
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date, each of these courts has ruled in favor of the constitutionality of DNA
indictments for varying reasons.9
Some courts have been reticent to declare that a genetic profile
alone, without any other descriptive content, satisfies the Fourth
Amendment notice requirement. 90 While still affirming the overall
constitutionality of the use of DNA as part of the description process, these
courts have hinted that some accompanying identification of the suspect,
potentially in the form of a physical description, may be necessary. 91 This
particular issue has not been explicitly addressed in any state, and courts
have not found the use of DNA indictments
to be an impediment to a
92
defendant's constitutional right to notice.
V. ANALYSIS
The principal criticism of John Doe DNA indictments is the
combination of the flaws of DNA evidence and the potential for long
periods between the commission of a crime, the filing of an indictment
based on a genetic profile, and a subsequent affixation of the defendant's
name to the indictment. 93 As noted, the preferred method of DNA analysis
that the defendant's constitutional right to notice was satisfied when his indictment was unsealed,
and there is no requirement that he be referred to by name for the notice requirement to be met.
855 N.Y.S.2d at 525. The Supreme Court of Kansas held in State v. Belt that while the concept
of DNA indictments is constitutionally valid, the execution was improper in this specific case
because the warrant failed to describe the defendant with any particularity. 179 P.3d at 450-51.
In People v. Robinson, the California Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
particularity requirement is satisfied by listing a DNA profile partly because it prevents seizing
something not identified in the warrant. 224 P.3d at 80. Finally, in the most recent example of a
state affirming the use of DNA indictments, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
acknowledged in Commonwealth v. Dixon that there are problems that defendants face when
subjected to these indictments, but these issues do not invalidate their use. 938 N.E.2d at 888.
89 See cases cited supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing cases holding DNA
arrest warrants and indictments constitutionally valid).
90 See Dixon, 938 N.E.2d at 884 n.16 (declining to answer whether genetic profile
alone
suffices for constitutional purposes); Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 372 (acknowledging merits of
argument that more description may be useful). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Dabney
agreed with the defendant that without any description beyond a DNA profile, a suspect might not
be on notice that the profile is his. 663 N.W.2d at 372. Some further description may be
necessary in cases where there is no additional description. Id. Similarly, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Dixon followed the approach set forth in Dabney and declined to even
address the issue. 938 N.E.2d at 884 n.16.
91 See cases cited supra notes 88, 90 and accompanying text (noting possibilities of further
descriptions suggested by Dabney and Dixon courts).
92 See Sucherman, supra note 3, at 901 (recognizing notice has not acted as barrier to DNA
warrants); see also Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (finding right to notice not impeded).
93 See Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 983-84 (explaining risks of inaccurate DNA evidence);
Roth, supra note 4, at 1145-46 and accompanying text (voicing concerns about DNA
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is PCR-STR testing.9 4 Despite being the method that most researchers use,95
PCR-STR is the most susceptible to contamination and inaccurate results.
This problem is compounded when considered alongside other issues that
can occur during long gaps between crimes and trials, such as the loss of
critical evidence and the fading of witness's memories.96 Considering the
recently documented incidents of botched DNA lab work, and that juries

tend to place a strong emphasis on the results of such work as presented at
trial, defendants face a difficult task in producing convincing rebuttal
evidence after a long period of time has passed. 97
Aside from the practical implications of the use of John Doe DNA
indictments, there are specific constitutional concerns that deserve
attention." The issue of whether indicting a DNA sample conflicts with
the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement has been addressed by
several courts, including the highest courts in Wisconsin and
Massachusetts. 99 However, while no court has overturned a conviction
acquired as a result a DNA indictment, none have specifically addressed
whether a DNA sample alone could sufficiently describe a suspect. 1OO
indictments); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 5, at 45 and accompanying text (citing laboratory
errors leading to wrongful convictions); Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1613-14 and accompanying text

(discussing criticisms of John Doe DNA warrants and indictments).
94 See United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1996) (commenting on nature
of
RFLP and PCR procedures), overruled by United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir.
2008); Commonwealth v. Curin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 446-447 (Mass. 1991) (detailing RFLP
procedure); State v. Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. 2003) (describing PCR procedure);
Davenport, supra note 29, at 1016-17 (describing two types of DNA analysis); Porch, supra note

25, at 1242-43 (contrasting PCR and RFLP testing methods and popularity); Riley, supra note 20
and accompanying text (describing evolution of PCR testing and reasons for popularity in
scientific community); Smith & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2471 (noting drawbacks of PCR
testing).
95

See Smith & Gordon, supra note 1, at 2471-72 (elaborating on problems associated with

PCR-STR testing).

See Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1614-15 (listing ways evidence may be compromised during
time prior to trial). Ulmer contends that the older the crime, the greater the chance that an
important piece of evidence has been lost, destroyed, or compromised in some other way. Id. at
1613-14. Furthermore, Ulmer argues that with the passage of time it becomes increasingly
difficult for a defendant to conduct his own DNA testing to rebut earlier test results gathered by
the prosecution. Id. at 1617-19.
97 See Boies, supra note 35, at 416-17 (describing DNA lab errors and juror bias toward
DNA); Thompson, supra note 36, at 10-12 (same).
98 See People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 60-61, 80 (Cal. 2010) (analyzing whether Fourth
Amendment particularity requirement met by DNA indictments); Bernasconi, supra note 5, at
1024-26 (discussing potential constitutional infringements from DNA indictments). But see
Hunter, supra note 78, at 624 (arguing DNA indictments do not violate constitutional rights).
99 See cases cited supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (recounting different court
rulings on John Doe DNA indictments).
100 See cases cited supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting decisions in Wisconsin and
Massachusetts declined to address issue).
96
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Similarly, no court has found such an indictment invalid on the grounds
that it violated a defendant's fundamental right to a speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment. 1 1 Likewise, no decision has held that the delay
between indicting a defendant's DNA sample and later attaching his name
to the indictment constitutes an unreasonable delay that subjects him to
prolonged detention, public humiliation, or a trial involving decayed
evidence. 10 2 Some commentators have taken a hard-line approach and
insist that these indictments present no constitutional violation, as they are
most often used in prosecutions of violent or sexual assault crimes -events
witnesses are unlikely to forget.0 3 Furthermore, 04
some courts have chosen
to pass on the Sixth Amendment issue altogether. 1
One of the essential rationales behind the Sixth Amendment's
Speedy Trial Clause is to counter the possibility that a criminal defendant
could be forced to either contend against or rely upon deteriorated
evidence. 05 DNA indictments conflict with this notion because they can
potentially delay a trial for many years, thereby placing the defendant in the
unenviable position of producing evidence that has not been affected by the
passage of time. 10 6 Nonetheless, courts have not found this argument
compelling enough to deem DNA indictments unconstitutional. 107
A clash also exists between John Doe DNA indictments and

101 See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Mass. 2010) (holding in favor of
DNA indictments); Sucherman, supra note 3, at 897-912 (recounting court decisions examining
Sixth Amendment challenges to DNA indictments).
102 See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (stating rationales behind Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial); cases cited supra note 88 and accompanying text (affirming
DNA indictments); Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 1016-17, 1018 & n.252 (noting purpose of Sixth
Amendment).
103 See Hunter, supra note 78, at 623-24 (contending no conflict between Sixth Amendment
and John Doe DNA indictments). Ignoring the fact that other critical evidence may be
compromised, Hunter insists there is no constitutional problem, and instead focuses on the
apparent infallibility of memories associated with a rape that may have happened years earlier.
Id. at 624. In turn, he erroneously asserts that there is no adverse effect on the defendant's case
because witnesses will likely still be reliable. Id. Furthermore, this argument disregards the fact
that eyewitness testimony has a history of being unreliable. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 228 (1967) (noting eyewitness testimony is imperfect).
104 See People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 79 (Cal. 2010) (suggesting there is no constitutional
prohibition against indictments); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878, 889 (Mass. 2010)
(suggesting legislature should determine whether existing safeguards in place for defendants are
adequate).
105 See Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120 (discussing basis for Speedy Trial Clause); Bernasconi, supra
note 5, at 1018 & n.252 (explaining rationale underlying Sixth Amendment right).
106 See Ulmer, supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing John Doe indictment
mechanism and noting potential time gap between indictment and trial).
107 See cases cited supra note 104 and accompanying text (detailing two courts that failed
to
find constitutional infractions).
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statutes of limitations. 108 Critics argue that DNA indictments circumvent
statutes of limitations and ignore their intended purpose of swiftly
prosecuting offenders while simultaneously maintaining a fair justice
system. 10 9 Conversely, proponents contend that the goals of statutes of
limitations are not displaced when a John Doe indictment is issued because
DNA evidence is preserved and will not differ in results, as its structure
will not change within the defendant. 110 Whereas opponents of these
indictments may argue that they violate fundamental rights set forth by the
Fourth and Sixth Amendments, no such argument exists with regard to
statutes of limitations, because they are purely the result of legislation. "'
The question thus becomes whether John Doe DNA indictments
delegitimize statutes of limitations and render them obsolete. 112
DNA indictments run completely contrary to the notion that
criminal statutes of limitations exist in part to afford defendants a fair
opportunity to defend themselves."'
This purported fair opportunity
dissipates once significant time has passed, and it becomes increasingly
difficult for defendants to produce their own exculpatory evidence,
especially when confronted with DNA evidence.'1
During the Model
Penal Code's adoption period, the American Law Institute cited the need to

prosecute cases based on fresh evidence as the most important reason for
having statutes of limitations." 5
This reason, however, has been

108 See Powell, supra note 61, at 127 (noting John Doe indictments exist as exception to

federal statutes of limitations). So long as a DNA profile is indicted within the original statute of
limitations, that period is tolled indefinitely until a name can be affixed to the indictment. Id. at
127-28.
109 See id. at 128 (contending John Doe indictments ignore principals upon which statutes of
limitations are based). Powell cites fairness to the defendant as a central goal of criminal statutes
of limitations that is ignored by the allowance of DNA indictments. Id. at 133 -34. Defendants
are increasingly less likely to be able to adequately defend themselves when long periods of time
are allowed to pass between an alleged incident and trial. Id.
110 See Hunter, supra note 78, at 606 (arguing no prejudice to criminal defendants because
DNA evidence does not change). But see Boies, supra note 35, at 411-20 (suggesting problems
with DNA evidence and questioning its infallibility); Meyers, supra note 46, at 52 (same); Porch,
supra note 25, at 1243 (same); Riley, supra note 20 (same); Thompson, supra note 36, at 10-12
(same).
III See Adlestein, supra note 53, at 249, 250 & n.223 (noting statutes of limitations are
legislatively enacted).
112 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of statutes of limitations
given new technologies). One commentator posits that many now view "the criminal statute of
limitations as a relic of a bygone era" as a result of newfound abilities to preserve evidence. See
Powell, supra note 61, at 135.
113 See id. at 127 (arguing adequate defense becomes more difficult with lapse in time).
114 See Boies, supra note 35, at 416 (detailing problems of jury interpretation of DNA);
Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1613-14 (discussing problems of evidence decay);
115 See Adlestein, supra note 53, at 264-65 (recounting "fresh evidence" as foremost
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neutralized to a great extent by DNA indictments."'
Assuming courts continue to uphold the validity of John Doe
indictments, the first step in remedying concerns relating to them is to
ensure that DNA testing is closely monitored and properly performed. 117 It
is crucial that DNA evidence, the centerpiece of these indictments, is

accurate because a defendant who must answer to accusations levied years
after they may have first been brought is placed at a tremendous
disadvantage." 8 Additionally, the trend of judicial instruction to juries on
how to properly interpret and handle DNA evidence will need to

continue. 119 Juror misunderstanding of DNA evidence exacerbates its other

flaws, thereby necessitating the need for clarity and proper instruction. 120
Much of the burden of ensuring that DNA evidence is properly
tested and later admitted falls on defense attorneys. 121 As is abundantly
clear, criminal defendants are placed at the greatest disadvantage by DNA
indictments. 122 Ideally, defense lawyers, being the representatives of those
most afflicted, will recognize the problems these indictments create and
push for reforms in both the testing labs and the courts. 123
One solution for achieving greater compliance with the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement may be to require that more than

importance for statutes of limitations).
116 See Bernasconi, supra note 5, at 990, 995, 999, 1024 (contending DNA indictments
reduce need to prosecute based on fresh evidence).
117 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 12 (urging criminal defense attorneys to advocate for
testing reform). Thompson points out that the labs in which some of the worst testing mishaps
took place received little scrutiny and oversight from outside sources. Id. As a way of ensuring
that the evidence is accurately analyzed, defense lawyers need to urge that these labs are closely
supervised and the results are closely scrutinized in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. Id. at
12-13.
118 See id. (asserting need for accurate testing to preserve defendants' constitutional rights).
119 See cases cited supra note 52 and accompanying text (listing cases in which judges
specifically addressed how to handle DNA evidence); see also Boies, supra note 35, at 416
(stating defense attorneys shoulder responsibility of ensuring jurors understand DNA evidence).
120 See Boies, supra note 35, at 417 ("The adversarial nature of court proceedings enhances
the problems when seemingly harmless inferential leaps are made . . . . This suppression of
uncertainty could lead to serious errors by the jury.").
121 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 12-13 (encouraging defense lawyers to take active role
in oversight efforts).
122 See Ulmer, supra note 6, at 1613-14 (noting problems defendants encounter when
charged by DNA indictments).
123 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 14-15 (arguing defense attorneys are best equipped to
confront DNA issues). Defense lawyers often discover irregularities when reviewing cases. See
id. at 14. As a result, they are in the best position to argue for reforms. See id. Thompson points
to successful efforts in Virginia to establish oversight commissions for forensic laboratories as a
model for future improvements. Id.
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just a DNA sample be listed on the indictment itself 124 The fact that some
courts have hinted at the possibility that a genetic profile alone would not
pass constitutional muster for descriptive notice purposes indicates that
some measure of restraint is possible in the future. 125 However, as no court
has definitively answered this question, it remains purely within the realm
of conjecture whether any court will adopt such an approach in the
26
future. 1
It is unlikely that John Doe DNA indictments will be sweepingly
overturned on the grounds of Sixth Amendment violations, but rather a
reversal is more likely on a fact driven, case-by-case evaluation. 127 A
defendant would likely need to prove that the prosecution intentionally
delayed the trial by waiting to affix a genetic profile to hinder the
defendant's case. 128 Absent fraudulent prosecutorial intentions, the reason
for the delay in trial would be legitimate because no name could be
attached to the DNA sample at the time of collection. 129 Furthermore, the
defendant would have to show actual prejudice on behalf of the
prosecution, and courts have been reluctant to recognize similar arguments
to date.' 30
The argument for DNA indictment invalidation based on
noncompliance with statutes of limitations will also fail, as these statutes
are a product of legislative creation."s' If anything, John Doe DNA
indictments and other technologically enhanced evidentiary devices could
eventually phase out criminal statutes of limitations for many crimes. 132
This end result would be a major upheaval in criminal justice, and would

124

See cases cited supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting no court has completely

addressed particularity issue). The courts in Dabney and Dixon both discussed the possibility that
more than just a genetic profile may be needed to develop an adequate description. See id.
125 See id. (examining Dabney and Dixon approaches to concern).
The Dabney court
indicated that notice might require more than just a description of a defendant's genetic profile.
State v. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). In Dixon, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court followed the same approach. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 938 N.E.2d 878,
884 n.16 (Mass. 2010).
126 See cases cited supra note 90 (noting courts that have examined issue).
127 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527-28, 530-32 (1972) (noting fact specific nature of
Sixth Amendment violation challenges).
128 See id. at 530-32 (detailing manner in which Sixth Amendment challenge may be
brought).
129 See id. (listing reason for delay as factor in determining whether violation took place).
130 See Sucherman, supra note 3, at 897-912 (noting juror prejudice and outcomes of
different DNA indictment cases).
131 See Adlestein, supra note 53, at 249, 250 & n.223 and accompanying text (explaining
statutes of limitations are designed by legislatures).
132 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (detailing arguments that new technology
renders statutes of limitations moot).
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reverse years of practice and precedent.'3 3
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no denying that John Doe DNA indictments are an
extremely powerful tool for prosecutors. They also give victims of violent
and sexual assault crimes the opportunity to see that their attackers are
brought to justice. However, the problems they create for criminal
defendants cannot be ignored. DNA indictments severely hinder the ability
of criminal defendants to defend themselves. With the typical jury placing
such enormous weight on DNA evidence, defendants face an extremely
difficult battle in cases where these indictments are utilized years after an
alleged incident occurred. It is especially troubling that these indictments
create such a prejudice in the face of conflicting constitutional dogma and
long held statutory precedent. Given society's ongoing desire to harshly
punish criminal offenders and the court system's repeated approval of this
practice, the use of DNA indictments is only likely to increase in the
coming years. With an increased use, however, comes an increased need
for regulation and caution. DNA testing needs to be closely monitored, and
juries need to know how to properly handle DNA evidence. To ensure that
the rights of their clients are properly protected, defense attorneys must
advocate for these steps to be taken. Without the necessary safeguards in
place, criminal defendants' rights will likely be diminished even further. If
a fair justice system is to be maintained, it is imperative that these rights be
preserved.
Daniel Gaudet
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See Adlestein, supra note 53, at 249-55 (discussing history of criminal statutes of

limitations).

